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336 Abstract
Fiscal policy can have positive effects on economic growth through changes in the 
structure of total expenditure, i.e. reductions in unproductive or current expendi-
ture, lower taxes, and higher government investment – provided that it is offset by 
a decrease in unproductive expenditure. Such changes reduce the size of go-
vernment, which positively affects output growth. Lower volatility of government 
investment expenditure is also growth-enhancing. However, the strongest growth 
effects are found for improvements in the fiscal balance, in particular if achieved 
by a reduction in the size of government expenditure. This suggests that a cautious 
fiscal policy stance may be the best way to improve growth.  
Keywords: growth, productive expenditure, distortionary taxation, volatility, 
fiscal balance
1 introduction
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the growth effects of fiscal po-
licy in new member states (NMS) of the EU. These countries have been only oc-
casionally included in the previous research due to the lack or low quality of data. 
However, over time more data have become available. As these countries have 
functioned within the same institutional and legal framework as advanced EU 
economies for several years now, there is a need to understand the effects of fiscal 
policy on their growth path. This paper endeavours to fill this gap by analysing the 
relationship between fiscal policy and growth on a balanced panel of NMS and 
Croatia over the period 1999-2010.  
Our empirical approach is based on a consistent treatment of the government bud-
get constraint in the context of static and dynamic panel data analyses. A com-
prehensive analysis of the growth effects of fiscal policy requires that both sides 
of the budget be considered. However, to prevent perfect co-linearity among fiscal 
variables, growth-neutral fiscal variables have to be omitted (Kneller et al., 1999). 
This strategy allows us to investigate how a particular change in fiscal policy af-
fects growth, and thus to suggest specific changes in fiscal instruments that could 
enhance growth.  
The paper also studies the growth effects of volatility in government investment. 
Dalić (2013) showed that government expenditure in NMS is generally pro-cycli-
cal, with a particularly strong pro-cyclical behaviour found for capital expendi-
ture. This raises the question whether the high volatility of government investment 
could produce its own growth effects over and above those resulting from a given 
level of investment expenditure. An empirical investigation of the growth effects 
of volatility in government investment is particularly interesting for NMS, where 
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337The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two outlines key contribu-
tions to the literature on fiscal policy and growth. Section three discusses the data 
and estimation strategy. Section four presents baseline results of econometric 
analysis. Robustness analysis is presented in section five. Section six concludes. 
2 literature review
In the recent literature, the relationship between fiscal policy and growth has been 
articulated, among other contributions, in endogenous growth models of Lucas 
(1988), Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). The implications of endo-
genous growth models for fiscal policy were also examined by Barro (1990), who 
discussed how fiscal policy could affect both the level of output and its steady 
state growth rate.  
In particular, Barro (1990) postulated that the impact of fiscal policy on growth is 
derived from the flow of government services, and introduced a distinction bet-
ween distortionary and non-distortionary taxation and productive and unproducti-
ve expenditure. He categorised as distortionary those taxes that affect the in-
vestment/saving decisions of private agents with respect to accumulation of 
physical and human capital. Non-distortionary taxes in his classification were 
those that do not affect these decisions. 
Government expenditure is differentiated according to its contribution to private 
production and productivity of total private capital (Zagler and Dürnecker, 2003). 
Expenditure categories that affect the productivity of private capital and/or the 
stock of total capital, such as expenditure on education (Lucas, 1988), health (Blo-
om, Canning and Sevilla, 2001), public infrastructure (Barro, 1990; Aschauer, 
1988), research and development (Romer, 1990) and enforcement of property 
rights (La Porta et al., 1996) are considered productive. Expenditure categories 
that do not affect the productivity of private capital or add to/subtract from the 
stock of total capital are considered unproductive. The classification of certain 
expenditure components as unproductive does not mean that they are unnecessary 
or wasteful, but rather that their potential welfare effects are too difficult to assess 
to be a focus of the growth analysis. At the same time, they need to be considered 
because the taxation required to finance them has growth implications. 
More generally, public expenditure, whether productive or unproductive, uses re-
sources and diverts them from potentially more efficient private uses. Productivity 
of public expenditure therefore also depends on the degree of its substitutability/
complementarity with private expenditure (Irmen and Kuehnel, 2009). The ove-
rall impact of fiscal policy on growth is thus the net result of various positive and 
negative effects of fiscal policy instruments on productivity of overall capital and 
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338 The effect of individual public expenditure categories on growth cannot be asse-
ssed without consideration of the overall macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy 
and its implications for the sustainability of public finance. In the presence of Ri-
cardian equivalence, fiscal expansion could leave overall output unchanged (Ba-
rro, 1979). At high levels of government debt, a permanent increase in government 
expenditure could even produce negative growth effects (Blanchard, 1990; Ale-
sina et al., 2002; Alesina and Ardagna, 2009). Even in the absence of Ricardian 
equivalence, persistent fiscal deficits and high public debt could harm growth be-
cause deficits require the government to absorb additional resources from the pri-
vate sector, which could have been used for the accumulation of private capital 
(Zagler and Dürnecker, 2003). Harmful effects of fiscal deficits and debt on 
growth could be further reinforced if government borrowing is used in order to 
finance less productive types of expenditure. 
These hypotheses have been empirically tested and extended in several directions, 
using for instance different classifications of government revenue and expendi-
ture, and different treatments of government budget constraints, i.e. different ways 
of accounting for the linear dependency among revenue, expenditure and the fi-
scal balance. Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996) concluded that the productivity 
of different expenditure components may depend on their share in total expendi-
ture, i.e. the productivity of the same expenditure component may differ depen-
ding on its relative size. Public investment is generally recognised as a productive 
determinant of growth (Aschauer, 1986; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Canning and 
Pedroni, 2004). However, there is also evidence of insignificant growth effects of 
public investment (Afonso and Furceri, 2008). 
Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) emphasized the need to include all fiscal 
policy variables in the analysis of growth effects of fiscal policy, so as to avoid the 
omitted variables bias. However, in order to avoid perfect co-linearity in such a 
case, variables with negligible growth effect should be excluded from regressions 
and treated as an implicit source of financing. Using this approach, Kneller, Blea-
ney and Gemmell (1999) showed that increases in productive expenditure have a 
positive effect on growth if achieved by non-distortionary taxes and cuts in unpro-
ductive expenditure. However, higher public investment has a negative effect on 
growth if the increase is financed with distortionary taxes. Bleaney, Gemmell and 
Kneller (2001) confirmed these results, and also found that government surpluses 
achieved through an increase in non-distortionary taxes and a reduction in unpro-
ductive expenditure have a positive impact on growth. Gemmell, Kneller and 
Sanz (2011) examined the robustness of previous results on the growth effects of 
fiscal policy on a sample of OECD countries, and again confirmed the negative 
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339Some newer research highlighted the relationship between macroeconomic vola-
tility as an important additional channel of fiscal policy influence on growth. 
Fatas  and Mihov (2003) argued that the volatility of government expenditure was 
the main determinant of business cycle volatility, which in turn negatively affects 
growth (see Hnatovska and Loayza, 2004 and Aghion and Banerjee, 2005).  Fatas 
and Mihov (2009) also provided evidence that the volatility of public expenditure 
had its own direct effects on growth, which are independent of the effects of out-
put volatility on growth. Afonso and Furceri (2008) confirmed the harmful growth 
effects of volatility of total expenditure and investment expenditure for EU-15 
countries.  
In sum, the literature underlying the analysis carried out in this paper focuses on 
the effects of fiscal policy on private sector behaviour and the formation of human 
and physical capital. Fiscal policy affects economic growth through both the level 
and volatility of taxes and government expenditure. Moreover, the impact of fiscal 
policy on growth will depend on which taxes and expenditures are adjusted.   
3 methodology and data
The relationship between fiscal policy instruments and growth is estimated by 
regressing the annual rate of real GDP growth on a set of conditioning non-fiscal 
variables and a set of fiscal explanatory variables. Therefore, the following growth 
equation is estimated (subscripts denote country i and year t). 
 (1)
Where: 
 – gi,t denotes the growth rate of real GDP for country i (i = 1..13) in year t 
(t = 1..12)
 – Yik,t is a matrix of k non-fiscal variables (k = 1..5) expressed in logarithms
 – Xij,t is a matrix of m (m = 1..13) fiscal variables expressed in logarithms that 
also includes a variable measuring the volatility of government investment 
expenditure.
The choice of non-fiscal explanatory variables follows the standard approach in 
the literature: as proposed by Levine and Renelt (1992), we include initial GDP 
per capita (i.e. lagged GDP per capita), inflation, average growth rate of labour 
force, the share of investment in GDP, and openness (for definitions of variables 
see the appendix).   
The expected sign of the coefficient on GDP per capita is negative: poorer econo-
mies normally grow faster than richer ones. Lagged inflation is also expected to 
have a negative coefficient: high inflation is bad for growth because it discourages 
investment in long-term projects (Barro, 2003). The growth rate of labour force 
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340 supply of labour and physical capital; their coefficients should therefore be posi-
tive. Openness has an ambiguous effect on growth: a more open economy could 
grow faster than a less open economy if there is sufficient external demand. How-
ever, a more open economy is also more exposed to external shocks. The sign of 
the coefficient on openness therefore has to be determined empirically for the 
sample at hand. 
The set of fiscal variables includes: 
 – a measure of volatility of government investment expenditure, defined by 
equation (2) and included with a lag of one year;
 – variables describing the overall government activity, i.e. total revenue, total 
expenditure and fiscal balance; 
 – disaggregated components of revenue and expenditure. 
All fiscal variables are measured as a share of GDP and expressed in logarithms; 
their scope is related to general government. For details, see the appendix. 
Volatility of government investment expenditure is measured by squared devia-
tions of the annual level of country’s investment from the sample average: 
 (2)
where GOV_INVi,t represents the share of  government investment expenditure in 
GDP in country i in year t. This measure of volatility does not discriminate bet-
ween increases and decreases in the level of government investment; i.e. it only 
signals the intensity of a change regardless of its direction. We expect the coeffi-
cient on this variable to have a negative sign because changes in the level of go-
vernment investment may increase uncertainty about the inputs the government 
provides for private production. Volatile public capital formation may also lead to 
wrong strategic positioning of private production and to suboptimal private pro-
duction capacity that cannot be easily altered. Therefore we include this variable 
with a one-year lag.  
As discussed above, to study the impact of fiscal policy on growth we need to di-
stinguish between distortionary and non-distortionary taxes, and productive and 
unproductive expenditure. Table 1 provides the classification used in this paper. 
While all major taxes are distortionary in some respect, the distortions that are 
relevant for growth are taken to be those related to decisions on saving and in-
vestment. Therefore, taxes on income, profit and social contributions are classified 
as distortionary – they introduce tax wedge that can change the incentives to ac-
cumulate physical and human capital, which can in turn harm economic growth 
(Zagler and Dürnecker, 2003). Taxes on goods and services are considered 
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341distort consumption-saving decisions at different dates (Bleaney, Gemmell and 
Kneller, 2001).  
table 1
Fiscal variables 
 Fiscal variable included  in regression equation
Revenue/expenditure  






Taxes on income, profit and property
Social contributions
Non-distortionary taxes
Taxes on domestic goods and services
Taxes on international trade












Productive expenditure_health Health expenditure
Productive expenditure_education Education expenditure
Other productive expenditure
Expenditure on public order and safety
Defence expenditure
Expenditure on economic affairs 
Expenditure on environment protection
Unproductive expenditure
Social security and welfare expenditure
Expenditure on recreation
Expenditure on housing

















Other current and capital transfers
Investment expenditure Gross fixed capital formation
Distinguishing between productive and unproductive expenditure in the available 
statistics is more problematic than distinguishing between distortionary and non-
distortionary taxes. The reason is that the underlying statistical principles of eco-
nomic and functional classifications of expenditure are not guided by growth con-
siderations. For instance, few would disagree that health and education expendi-
tures are productive, i.e. have positive growth effects. But expenditure on econo-
mic affairs is composed of both productive expenditure items, e.g. spending on 
public transport and communication, and unproductive spending such as subsidies 
to loss-making public enterprises. These issues are recognised in the literature 
using the functional classification (see Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell, 1999; 
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342 authors to use the economic classification of expenditure instead (Gupta et al., 
2002; de Avila and Strauch, 2003; Afonso and Furceri, 2008). 
The approach taken in this paper tries to circumvent, to the extent possible, some 
of these issues by using both classifications. Therefore, the regression equation (1) 
is first estimated for disaggregated expenditure variables based on the functional 
classification, and then for expenditure variables based on the economic classifi-
cation. The results of these two approaches are complementary rather than mu-
tually exclusive. For example, positive growth effects of government investment 
(derived from the economic classification) are not in contradiction with positive 
growth effects of spending on education (derived from the functional classifi-
cation). 
Expenditure on economic services is on balance considered productive because 
one of its largest components is expenditure on transport and communication, 
which normally has positive effect on growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). Expen-
diture on defence and public order and safety is considered productive because it 
serves to maintain the rule of law and thus contributes to investor security and the 
stability of property rights, which are growth-enhancing (Barro, 1990).
Expenditure classified as unproductive includes social security and welfare, hou-
sing, recreation and public administration. Spending on these items does not di-
rectly affect private production and capital formation. One should note, however, 
that the quality and efficiency of public administration are reflected in the quality 
of institutions that are recognised as important determinants of growth in institu-
tional economics (Acemoglu, 2012). Therefore, it is also possible to argue that 
expenditure on general public services should be considered productive. In order 
to address this issue, in the robustness analysis in section five we use an alterna-
tive classification that includes expenditure on general public services as produ-
ctive. 
When economic classification is used, total expenditure is grouped into current 
and investment expenditure. Investment expenditure is considered productive and 
current expenditure on balance unproductive because of the large weight of social 
security benefits, subsidies and interest payments. Regarding compensation of 
employees, the same caveat holds as with functional expenditure on general pu-
blic services; however, we did not test for this case separately in the robustness 
analysis. 
The estimation strategy follows Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) and Blea-
ney, Gemmell and Kneller (2001). They pointed out that the results of regressions 
examining the relationship between fiscal policy and growth depend on how one 
treats the budget constraint. If the set of fiscal variables includes all the elements 
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343they sum up to zero and perfect co-linearity is present. To avoid the problem of 
perfect co-linearity, at least one fiscal variable entering the budget constraint 
should be omitted. This variable then represents the implicit source of financing of 
a unit change in the relevant fiscal variables that are included in the regression. 
Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) showed that the size of coefficients on fi-
scal variables included in the regression changes depending on the omitted fiscal 
variable. In other words, the effect of a particular fiscal policy instrument on 
growth may change depending on the way it is financed.
Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) suggested that the omitted variables should 
be those that theory suggests do not affect the production function. Good candida-
tes for omitted variables are thus unproductive expenditure, non-distortionary 
taxes, and the two taken together. Furthermore, if these variables are really 
growth-neutral, their coefficients should be insignificant when included in regre-
ssions. Adam and Bevan (2005) cautioned that country heterogeneity made it dif-
ficult to identify any revenue or expenditure category as growth-neutral across all 
countries. Therefore, coefficient estimates in this type of regression should be in-
terpreted as measuring the effect of a particular fiscal variable net of the effect of 
omitted fiscal variables. Gemmell (2001) further noted that even where all go-
vernment expenditure was productive, any increase in taxes from an already high 
ratio of taxes or expenditure to GDP could generate negative growth effects.  
In this paper, we compiled data for a balanced panel of ten new EU member states 
and Croatia over the period 1999-2010. These countries were only occasionally 
considered in previous research due to either the non-existence or the low quality 
of data, especially in view of the structural breaks and rapid changes these coun-
tries went through in the 1990s. We chose 1999 as the initial year in the sample 
because most countries began their EU accession talks at the time, which gradual-
ly led to an improvement in the quality of data. Croatia is included in the sample 
because it completed the alignment with EU standards through 2010. The sources 
of data are the Eurostat data base, the WDI data base (for some control variables) 
and national sources for Croatia. 
4 empirical results
4.1 descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis 
The descriptive statistics for regression variables are presented in table 2. They 
confirm the large variability of data across the sample. The sample average growth 
rate amounted to 3.4%, and the average share of total expenditure in GDP to 
41.6%. The sample average government balance was a deficit of 3.4% of GDP. All 
countries in the sample had on average higher unproductive than productive ex-
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344 table 2
Descriptive statistics 






Growth rate of output 3.4 4.5 11.5 Latvia (2006) -17.7 Latvia (2009)
GDP per capita, cons. 
EUR 6,812.2 3,866.1 16,740.8 Cyprus (2008) 1,612.9 Bulgaria (1999)
Investment ratio, % of 
GDP 23.5 4.3 34.9 Estonia (2006) 14.2 Malta (2000)
Openness, % of GDP 117.2 32.0 194.8 Malta (2000) 53.2 Romania (2010)
Inflation, ch 5.1 6.2 45.8 Romania (1999) -1.1 Lithuania (2003)
Labour force growth,  
in % -0.06 1.48 4.3 Slovenia (2004) -8.8 Romania (2002)
Total revenue, % of GDP 38.2 3.7 46.9 Hungary (2010) 31.7 Lithuania (2004)
Total expenditure, % of 
GDP 41.6 4.8 52.2 Hungary (2006) 33.0 Lithuania (2003)
Fiscal balance, % of GDP -3.4 2.8 3.4 Cyprus (2007) -12.3 Slovakia (2000)
Distortionary taxes, % of 
GDP 20.3 2.7 25.8 Cyprus (2007) 13.2 Bulgaria (2010)
Non-distortionary taxes, 
% of GDP 13.6 2.2 18.6 Croatia (2000) 10.1 Slovakia (2010)
Other revenue, % of GDP 5.1 1.2 10.4 Bulgaria (1999) 3.2 Romania (2000)
Productive exp._
education, % of GDP 5.2 1.1 7.5 Cyprus (2010) 3.3 Croatia (2006)
Productive expenditure_
health, % of GDP 5.0 1.3 7.8 Czech R. (2010) 2.5 Bulgaria (2001)
Other productive 
expenditure, % of GDP 9.7 1.8 17.4 Slovakia (2000) 6.4 Poland (2000)
Unproductive 
expenditure, % of GDP 21.6 3.9 31.6 Hungary (2009) 14.6 Estonia (2006)
Government investment, 
% of GDP 3.6 1.1 6.8 Czech R. (2003) 1.1 Latvia (2001)
Current expenditure,  
% of GDP 36.5 4.4 47.0 Hungary (2009) 27.8 Estonia (2007)
Variability of government 
investment 0.87 1.30 0.0 Hungary (2004) 7.1 Romania (1999)
Table 3 presents bivariate correlations between regression variables. Improve-
ments in fiscal balance (i.e. higher surpluses or lower deficits) are strongly and 
positively correlated with real GDP growth, while total government revenue and 
expenditure, as well as some of their disaggregated components, are negatively 
correlated with growth. As expected, different revenue and expenditure compo-
nents are highly correlated with each other, highlighting the importance of the 
estimation strategy that avoids perfect multi co-linearity among fiscal variables. 
The preliminary findings from bivariate simple regressions are reported in graph 
1. The top left-hand panel shows a negative relationship between government size 
and growth. The bottom left-hand panel shows a positive relationship between 
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345tive correlation between the level of total revenue and growth (top) and the vola-
tility of government investment and growth (bottom). 
graph 1


















Real GDP growth = 0.1 - 0.002 Total revenues; R2 = 0.2; N=156
Total government revenue















































Volatility of government investment









Real GDP growth = 0.03 - 0 0004; R2 = 0.1; N=156
Source: Author’s calculation.
4.2 baseline regressions
Equation (1) was estimated using two-way fixed effects OLS estimator with the 
correction for first-order serial correlation in the error term. The Hausman test of 
significance of fixed versus random effects confirmed that it was appropriate to 
use the fixed effects estimator. The likelihood ratio test for the significance of 
 fixed effects indicated the importance of both cross-section and time effects, 
which led us to use the two-way fixed effects estimator.
Column (2) in table 4 reports the baseline results for non-fiscal variables and the 
volatility of government investment. Columns (3) to (5) show the estimates with 
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347table 4
Growth effects of overall government activity 
Estimation method: OLS two-way fixed effects 
Dependent variable: real output growth rate 
 
Omitted fiscal variable
Baseline Fiscal balance Total revenue Total expenditure
1 2 3 4 5
GDP per capita, lagged
-0.166*** -0.149*** -0.154*** -0.155***
(0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
Investments
0.105*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.085***
(0.035) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Labour force growth
0.149 0.190** 0.193** 0.197**
(0.167) (0.090) (0.092) (0.092) 
Openness
0.118*** 0.063** 0.063 0.064**
(0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) 
Inflation, lagged
-0.073*** -0.123*** -0.121*** -0.121***
(0.053) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Total expenditure
 -0.217*** -0.210***   
 (0.073) (0.059)   
Total revenue
 -0.011  -0.189***
 (0.101)   (0.054) 
Fiscal balance1
   -0.003 0.465***
  (0.241) (0.164) 
Volatility of investment 
expenditure, lagged
-0.0029*** -0.0027*** -0.0027** -0.0027***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
R2˜ 0.745 0.825 0.825 0.822
Number of observations 156 156 156 156
Note: ***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
1Fiscal balance is defined as (1 + fiscal balance/100); an increase denotes an improvements  
in fiscal balance, i.e. a reduction of the deficit or an increase of the surplus. 
Likelihood ratio test for joint significance of cross section and period fixed effect: p-value 
χ2(229.7;23) = 0.000. 
Hausman test for the significance of random vs. fixed effect: p-value χ2 (193.5;8)= 0.000.
All of the non-fiscal variables have the expected sign and most are highly signifi-
cant. Inflation and labour force growth gain in statistical significance with the in-
clusion of fiscal variables. The coefficient on lagged volatility of government in-
vestment expenditure, although small in size, is negative and statistically signifi-
cant in all regressions presented. A 1% increase in the volatility of government 
investment expenditure reduces the GDP growth rate in the sample on average by 
0.003 percentage points. This result is in line with Afonso and Furceri (2008), who 
found negative growth effects of government investment volatility in advanced 
EU economies.
If fiscal balance is omitted and assumed to adjust freely to changes in government 
revenue and expenditure (column 3) the coefficient on total expenditure is nega-
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348 cant. Negative growth effects of government spending are further confirmed if 
revenue is omitted from the regression (column 4): a 1% increase in total expe-
nditure reduces the growth rate of real GDP by 0.21 percentage points. Column 
(5) shows that a 1% increase in total revenue reduces the real growth rate by a 
similar amount (0.19 percentage points). The coefficient on fiscal balance became 
positive and significant in this regression, indicating that an improvement in fiscal 
balance might be growth-enhancing if achieved through a reduction in government 
expenditure. 
The negative relationship between growth and total expenditure (which measures 
the size of the government) indicates that any positive contribution of productive 
spending may be on balance offset by the negative contribution of the overall 
government size.  
Table 5 presents the results for disaggregated revenue and expenditure compo-
nents.  Coefficients for non-fiscal variables are not reported because they maintain 
their sign and significance. Regression results for fiscal variables based on fun-
ctional classification are reported in columns (2) to (4), while columns (5) to (7) 
report the results for economic classification of expenditure. When functional 
classification is used, the estimation strategy requires us to omit expenditure items 
suggested by theory to have negligible growth effects. Therefore non-distorti-
onary taxes, unproductive expenditure, and both of these items combined are 
omitted and assumed to be the variables that adjust in response to changes in fiscal 
variables included in regressions.  When economic classification is used, non-di-
stortionary taxes, current expenditures, and the two combined are omitted.  
The coefficient on volatility of government investment maintains its size and si-
gnificance in regressions in table 5. The disaggregated approach confirms that the 
volatility of investment expenditure has its own negative growth effects, over and 
above those implied by the level and structure of spending.
We find no evidence of growth-enhancing effects of productive expenditure (co-
lumns 2 to 4). This result contradicts theoretical predictions, in particular with 
respect to education and health spending. However, this does not mean that these 
expenditure components are irrelevant for growth in these countries: the sample is 
composed of upper middle-income economies, for which the structure and effi-
ciency rather than the level of such spending might be important for growth. 
Aghion and Durlauf (2009), for example, pointed out the importance of higher 
education for counties approaching the technology frontier. In order words, the 
growth-enhancing effects could be hidden in the composition of these expenditure 
components or in their efficiency. Uncovering these effects would require further 
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349table 5
Growth effects of expenditure and taxation components 
Estimation method: OLS two-way fixed effects  
Dependent variable: real output growth rate 





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Distortionary taxes
0.052 -0.089** -0.071 -0.042 -0.115*** -0.109**
(0.053) (0.038) (0.052) (0.057) (0.040) (0.049)
Non-distortionary 
taxes
– -0.100** – – -0.104*** –
 (0.044)   (0.034)  
Other revenue
0.024 -0.006 0.006 0.016 0.017 0.019
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Productive 
expenditure_health
-0.021 0.009 -0.008    




0.002 0.032 0.013    
(0.037) (0.045) (0.051)    
Other productive 
expenditure
-0.086*** -0.012 -0.036**    
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015)    
Unproductive 
expenditure
-0.170*** – –    
(0.052)      
Fiscal balance1
-0.193 0.519*** 0.360** -0.168 0.601*** 0.522***
(0.262) (0.167) (0.171) (0.270) (0.159) (0.177)
Current 
expenditure
   -0.322*** – –
   (0.075)   
Investment  
expenditure 
   -0.002 0.019** 0.013




-0.0027* -0.0026*** -0.0029*** -0.0022*** -0.0022*** -0.0026***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005)
R2˜ 0.832 0.818 0.798 0.840 0.823 0.800
Number of 
observations 156 156 156 156 156 156
Note: ***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
1 Fiscal balance is defined as: (1+fiscal deficit (surplus)/100) because of which increase in fis-
cal balance means improvements in fiscal balance, i.e. reduction in deficit.  
Likelihood ratio test for joint significance of cross section and period fixed effect: p-value 
χ2(229.7;23) = 0.000.  
Hausman test for the significance of fixed effect: p-value χ2(167.6;12)= 0.000.  
Moreover, the coefficient for other productive expenditures is negative if non- 
distortionary taxation is used as a source of financing (columns 2 and 4). This 
suggests that higher taxes are bad for growth even if they are used to finance pro-
ductive expenditure. One should note, however, that “other productive” expendi-
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350 ding on communication and transportation infrastructure. These statistical we-
aknesses of functional classification can affect the results; therefore, we also need 
to consider the economic classification of expenditure. 
The coefficient on fiscal balance is highly significant and positive if implicit fina-
ncing is not exclusively based on taxation (columns 3 and 4). When the balance 
improves by 1 percentage point as a result of lower unproductive expenditure, real 
GDP growth improves by as much as 0.52% percentage points. When the fiscal 
balance improves as a result of changes in both non-distortionary taxes and unpro-
ductive expenditure; the growth rate increases by 0.36 percentage points. How-
ever, if only non-distortionary taxes are used to reduce the deficit, the coefficient 
on fiscal balance is insignificant. These results suggest that to reduce fiscal deficits 
is the most effective way to boost economic growth. Positive growth effects of 
improvements in the fiscal balance are also found by Kneller, Bleaney and Gem-
mell (1999), Gupta et al. (2002), and Gemmell, Kneller and Sanz (2011). 
Columns (5) to (7) present the results for expenditure variables based on the eco-
nomic classification. The coefficient on government investment is positive and 
statistically significant if current expenditure is omitted from the regression. This 
suggests that an increase in government investment offset by a decrease in unpro-
ductive expenditure, which is the largest component of current expenditure, raises 
the growth rate of output. On the other hand, if the increase in investment is fina-
nced with non-distortionary taxes, then higher government investment has a negli-
gible impact on growth. Even when positive, the coefficient on investment expe-
nditure is small and often lower than that on fiscal balance. In other words, impro-
vement of the fiscal balance is much more beneficial for growth than an increase 
in government investment. 
Finally, an increase in current expenditure has negative growth effects, comple-
menting to some extent the results presented in column (2). A 1% increase in 
current expenditure financed by higher non-distortionary taxes reduces the growth 
rate of real GDP by 0.32 percentage points (column 5). 
These results point to a more general conclusion that fiscal policy can have posi-
tive effects on economic growth through changes in the structure of total expendi-
ture, i.e. reductions in unproductive or current expenditure can trigger positive 
growth effects of higher government investment of lower taxes. Such changes 
reduce the size of government, which positively affects output growth. Lower 
volatility of government investment expenditure is also growth-enhancing. 
 However, the strongest growth effects are found for improvements in the fiscal 
balance, in particular if achieved by a reduction of the size of government expen-
diture. This suggests that a cautious fiscal policy stance may be the best way to 
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3515 robustness analysis 
5.1 endogeneity of fiscal variables 
A common theme in the literature on fiscal policy and growth is reverse causality 
between fiscal variables and economic growth. A certain degree of reverse causa-
lity can also exist between growth and investment. If economic growth affects the 
right-hand side variables in a regression, then parameter estimates are biased and 
inconsistent. Although endogeneity of fiscal variables may be a smaller problem 
in regressions using disaggregated fiscal variables, it is nevertheless an issue that 
needs to be investigated. To address this issue, we used the dynamic specification 
and estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), i.e. the first-differenced 
GMM estimator. 
In particular, we re-estimated the models discussed above as dynamic models 
using the Arellano-Bond estimator that relies on first-differencing in order to eli-
minate country unobserved effects, and on lagged levels of endogenous variables 
as instruments. The estimates also included time dummies. The validity of instru-
ments was checked with the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.1 
The GMM estimates of the dynamic model with aggregate fiscal variables are 
presented in table 6. 
The results confirm the findings of the fixed effects models presented in table 4. 
The control variables remain significant, although the lagged growth rate is not 
significant. 
The significance of coefficients on fiscal variables remains unchanged, confirming 
the negative growth effect of government size, and the positive growth effects of 
stronger fiscal balance. The negative growth effect of the volatility of government 
investment is also confirmed.  
Table 7 presents the results of dynamic models for disaggregated fiscal variables. 
The results broadly confirm the findings of fixed effects models for expenditure 
variables and fiscal balance. Stronger fiscal balances achieved through expendi-
ture cuts are again found to have a positive and significant impact on growth. As 
with the fixed effect models in table 5, we do not find positive growth effects of 
increases in productive expenditure. The growth effects of higher productive ex-
penditure are again negative if the increase is associated with higher taxes, and 
insignificant if the increase is associated with lower unproductive spending. 
1 We also ran several panel unit root tests. The Levin, Lee and Chun test and the Hadri test, which assume a 
common unit root process across the all cross-section units, reject the presence of unit root for all of the tested 
series with the level of significance of at least 5%. The Im, Persan and Shin test and the Fisher tests, which 
assume individual unit root processes across the cross-section units, indicate the potential presence of unit 
roots in data for unproductive expenditure and expenditure on health and government investment. However, 
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352 table 6
Growth effects of overall fiscal activity, controlling for reverse causality 
Estimation method: first-differenced GMM  





Total revenue Total 
expenditure
1 2 3 4 5
Growth rate, lagged
0.254 -0.226 -0.257 -0.196
(0.189) (0.162) (0.164) (0.164)
Investments
0.094** 0.117*** 0.124*** 0.122***
(0.037) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Labour force growth
0.213 0.287** 0.284** 0.294**
(0.140) (0.131) (0.125) (0.090)
Openness
0.212** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.152***
(0.075) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Inflation, lagged
-0.375 -0.433* -0.429* -0.445*
(0.269) (0.225) (0.219) (0.231)
Total expenditure
 -0.33*** -0.401***  
 (0.106) (0.116)  
Total revenue
 -0.037  -0.348***
 (0.140)  (0.106)
Fiscal balance1
  -0.155 0.719***
  (0.348) (0.244)
Volatility of capital exp, lagged
-0.0088*** -0.0033** -0.0032** -0.0034**
(0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014)
Number of observations 143 129 129 129
Sargan test, χ2 p-value 0.33 0.21 0.31 0.22










Note: ***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
1 Fiscal balance is defined as (1 + fiscal balance/100) because of which increase in the varia-
ble of fiscal balance means improvements in fiscal balance, i.e. reduction in deficit.
On the other hand, a small positive growth effect of an increase in government 
investment achieved by a reduction in current expenditure, which was found in the 
fixed effects model, disappears in the dynamic model (column 6). Furthermore, 
the dynamic model does not confirm the positive growth effect of a decrease in 
distortionary taxes accompanied by a reduction in unproductive expenditure. The 
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353table 7
Growth effects of disaggregated components, controlling for reverse causality 
Estimation method: first-differenced GMM  
Dependent variable: real output growth rate 
Omitted fiscal  
variable
Functional classification  
of expenditure






















1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Growth rate, lagged
-0.189 -0.131 -0.094 -0.176 -0.058 0.007
(0.175) (0.141) (0.166) (0.160) (0.139) (0.140)
Investments
0.135** 0.133** 0.127** 0.085* 0.107** 0.098**
(0.061) (0.057) (0.064) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039)
Labour force growth
0.278*** 0.314** 0.240** 0.366*** 0.258** 0.211
(0.117) (0.081) (0.104) (0.107) (0.105) (0.137)
Openness
0.143*** 0.096*** 0.135*** 0.140*** 0.158*** 0.171***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.041) (0.033) (0.025) (0.032)
Inflation, lagged
-0.399*** -0.289*** -0.305** -0.448** -0.288* -0.306
(0.134) (0.105) (0.145) (0.222) (0.167) (0.211)
Distortionary taxes
0.199 -0.006 0.064 0.121 -0.037 -0.131
(0.126) (0.077) (0.107) (0.152) (0.102) (0.050)
Non-distortionary taxes
– -0.109 – – -0.070 –
 (0.070)   (0.056)  
Other revenues
0.025 -0.024 -0.055 0.049 -0.030 -0.039
(0.024) (0.017) (0.027) (0.046) (0.025) (0.018)
Expenditure on health
-0.082*** -0.006 -0.009    
(0.029) 0.044 0.043    
Expenditure on 
education
-0.077 0.030 0.008    
(0.060) (0.076) (0.076)    
Other productive 
expenditure
-0.196*** -0.064 -0.074*    
(0.073) (0.047) (0.041)    
Unproductive 
expenditure
-0.193** – –    
(0.084)      
Fiscal balance1
-0.535 0.697* 0.441* -0.606 0.679** 0.636**
(0.388) (0.375) (0.246) (0.494) (0.284) (0.274)
Current expenditure
   -0.546*** – –
   (0.192)   
Government investment
   -0.056 -0.143 -0.005
   (0.037) (0.019) (0.016)
Volatility of capital exp., 
lagged
-0.0029** -0.0034*** -0.0030*** -0.0030** -0.0029*** -0.0033***
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Number of observations 129 112 112 129 129 129
Sargan test, χ2 p-value 0.30 0.14 0.48 0.27 0.13 0.16
Instrument set




Invest ment,  
fiscal vari-
















bles        
lag 2-4
Note: ***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.    
1 Fiscal balance is defined as (1 + fiscal balance/100) because of which increase in the varia-
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354 5.2 alternative classification of productive expenditure
As noted above, the functional classification of productive and unproductive ex-
penditure has some weaknesses. To check whether our classification affects the 
results, we reclassified general public services as productive expenditure. The re-
sults of fixed effects as well as dynamic GMM estimations with this new classifi-
cation are presented in table 8.  
table 8
Reclassifying expenditure on general public services 
Dependent variable: growth rate of real output 
Estimation method OLS, two-way fixed effect GMM, first differenced
Omitted fiscal  
variable
Functional classification  
of expenditure






















1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Distortionary taxes
0.048 -0.079** -0.040 0.211 0.009 0.072
(0.053) (0.041) (0.056) (0.150) (0.083) (0.121)
Non-distortionary taxes
– -0.093** – – -0.095 –
 (0.044)   (0.067)  
Other revenues
0.024 -0.004 0.002 0.023 -0.003 0.040
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.035) (0.020) (0.031)
Productive exp._health
-0.028 0.004 -0.013 -0.121* -0.028 -0.021
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.041) (0.029) (0.039)
Productive exp._
education
0.007 0.027 0.070 -0.038 0.039 0.015
(0.035) (0.041) (0.041) (0.069) (0.074) (0.064)
Other productive 
expenditure
-0.132*** -0.035 -0.071** -0.256** -0.050 -0.133*
(0.027) (0.030) (0.023) (0.098) (0.065) (0.067)
Unproductive 
expenditure
-0.131*** – – -0.109 – –
(0.040)   (0.084)   
Fiscal balance1
-0.202 0.448** 0.370** -0.0367 0.786* 0.484*
(0.241) (0.194) (0.188) (0.372) (0.407) (0.284)
Volatility of capital 
exp, lagged
-0.0024*** -0.0027*** -0.0029*** -0.0029*** -0.0032*** -0.0032***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0013)
R2˜ 0.835 0.819 0.803    
Number of 
observations 156 156 156 129 112 112
Sargan test, χ2 p-value    0.51 0.19 0.39
Instrument set    
Investment 
fiscal var.     
lag 2-4
Investment, 
fiscal var.     
lag 2-5
Investment, 
fiscal var.    
lag 2-5
Note: ***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
1 Fiscal balance is defined as (1 + fiscal balance/100) because of which increase in the varia-
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355The coefficients on macroeconomic control variables are not reported as their si-
gns and levels of significance remained unchanged. 
The reclassification of expenditure on general public services from unproductive 
to productive did not change the results much. The coefficient on expanded pro-
ductive expenditure remains negative and statistically significant. However, the 
negative coefficient on the now narrower unproductive expenditure is not statisti-
cally significant in the new specification.
6 conclusion
The empirical results presented in this paper provide only weak support for the 
potential impact of government expenditure on growth in the new member states 
of the EU. We do not find evidence of a positive impact of expenditure on health 
and education on growth. The effects of government investment expenditure on 
growth are weak and are not present in the dynamic specification. When the effect 
of government investment on growth is observed, it is due to changes in the struc-
ture of total expenditure, i.e. it is present only if total expenditure is reduced, so 
that that the negative effects of government size on growth are lower. These re-
sults are surprising and require further investigation and possibly a more detailed 
breakdown of data on health, education and investment expenditure. On the other 
hand, we find evidence that the high volatility of government investment has its 
own direct negative effects on growth, which are independent of the growth ef-
fects of the level of investment expenditure. 
We find no support for the conjecture in the literature that shifts toward non-di-
stortionary taxes such as indirect taxes on goods and services have a positive ef-
fect on growth. Relying on non-distortionary taxes to increase public investment 
or reduce fiscal deficits has more or less the same negative effect on growth as 
relying on distortionary taxes.  
On the other hand, when improvements in fiscal balance are achieved by either 
cutting unproductive expenditure or a combination of a reduction in unproductive 
expenditure and an increase in non-distortionary taxes, then one can observe a 
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356 appendix
data sources and description of variables
The countries included in the analysis are Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta and 
Cyprus, i.e. the new member states plus Croatia.  Data sources include Eurostat 
data base, WDI data base and national sources for Croatia. 
If not otherwise stated, the source of data for non-fiscal variables is the Eurostat 
data base available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/stati-
stics/search_database.  
Growth rate of real output is calculated as the difference in the logarithm of real 
GDP in constant local currency units (with 2005 as the base year). Data for Malta 
in 1999 and 2000 are not available from the Eurostat database so the WDI data-
base was used.  
GDP per capita is the real GDP per capita in constant euro. 
Investments are measured by the share of gross fixed investment in GDP.
Growth of labour force is the difference in the logarithm of the activity ratio, 
defined as the share of active working age population (15-65 years old) in total 
population of that age group.  
Openness is defined as the GDP share of exports plus imports of goods and servi-
ces (source: WDI, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx). 
Inflation is defined as (1 + the annual percentage change in consumer prices/100). 
We use lagged inflation because changes in indirect taxes affect current inflation 
rate when one works with annual data (source: WDI).
All fiscal variables, except those for Croatia, are from the Eurostat database (http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database). National 
sources and author’s calculations are used for Croatia.  All fiscal variables are re-
lated to general government and correspond to the ESA95 statistical standard. All 
are expressed as logarithms of the ratio to GDP. 
Total revenue is the share of total general government revenue in GDP.
Total expenditure is the share of total general government expenditure in GDP.
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357Distortionary taxes, non-distortionary taxes and other revenues are expressed 
as percentage of GDP and represent reclassified components of total revenue as 
described in table 1. 
Productive expenditure_health, productive expenditure_education, other 
productive expenditure and unproductive expenditure are reclassified compo-
nents of total expenditure according to functional classification as described in 
table 1. All variables are expressed as a share of GDP. 
Current expenditure and investment expenditure are reclassified components 
of total expenditure based on economic classification as described in table 1. Both 
are expressed as a share of GDP.
methodological note on the croatian data
Croatian fiscal statistics is based on the GFS2001 standard and data are available 
after the year 2002.  The Ministry of Finance’s estimates of fiscal aggregates (total 
expenditure, total revenue and fiscal balance) in line with the ESA95 standard are 
available in EU related documents since 2003.  As the GFS2001 standard is close 
enough to the ESA95 standard to allow an appropriate comparison of disaggre-
gated components of revenue and expenditure, it is used for disaggregated va-
riables, while the ESA95 data are used for the overall government activity. 
Missing GFS2001 observations for the period 1999-2001 were calculated by the 
author through an adjustment of data based on the GFS1986 standard. The 
adjustment was mainly related to the treatment of employers’ contributions and 
the GFS1986 item Net lending and repayments. In comparison to the ESA95 total 
expenditure, this adjustment underestimates the level of total expenditure in 1999-
2003, because called government guarantees are not included due to the lack of 
reliable data. 
A functional classification of general government expenditure in Croatia is not 
publicly available, either. The author’s calculations are based on central go-
vernment data and intergovernmental flows. Central government expenditure ac-















































37 (4) 335-360 (2013)
358 references 
1. Acemoglu, D. and Robinson J. A., 2012. Why Nations Fail. New York: Crown 
Business.
2. Adam, C. S. and Bevan, D. L., 2005. Fiscal deficits and growth in developing 
countries. Journal of Public Economics, 89(4), pp. 571-597. doi: 10.1016/j.
jpubeco.2004.02.006
3. Afonso, A. and Furceri, D., 2008. Government Size, Composition and Econo-
mic Growth. ECB Working Paper, No. 849 [online]. Available at: <http://
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp849.pdf>.
4. Aghion, P. [et al.], 2005. Volatility and Growth: Credit Constraints and Pro-
ductivity-Enhancing Investment. NBER Working Paper 11349 [online]. Avai-
lable at: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w11349.pdf?new_window=1>. 
5. Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S., 2009. From Growth theory to Policy Design. The 
Commission on Growth and Development [online]. Available at: <www.
growthcommission.org>.
6. Aghion, P. and Howitt, P., 1990. A Model of Growth through Creative De-
struction. NBER Working paper 3223 [online]. Available at: <http://www.nber.
org/papers/w3223.pdf>. 
7. Aghion, P., 2009. Growth and Education. The Commission on Growth and 
Development [online]. Available at: <www.growthcommission.org>.
8. Akitoby, B. [et al.], 2004. The Cyclical and Long Term Behaviour of 
Government Expenditures in Developing Countries. IMF Working Paper 
04/202 [online]. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/
wp04202. pdf >.
9. Alesina, A. [et al.], 2002. Fiscal Policy, Profits and Investment. American Eco-
nomic Review, 92(3), pp. 571-589. doi: 10.1257/00028280260136255
10. Alesina, A. and Ardagna, S., 2009. Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes vs. 
Spending. NBER Working Paper 15438 [online]. Available at: <http://www.
nber.org/papers/w15438.pdf?new_window=1>. 
11. Arellano, M. and Bond, S., 1991. Some Tests of Specification for Panel data: 
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. Review 
of Economic Studies, 58(2), pp. 277-297. doi: 10.2307/2297968
12. Aschauer, D. A., 1988. Is Public Expenditure Productive? Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 23, pp. 177-200. doi: 10.1016/0304-3932(89)90047-0
13. Barlevy, G., 2003. The Costs of Business Cycles under Endogenous Growth. 
NBER Working Paper 9970 [online]. Available at: <http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w9970.pdf?new_window=1>.
14. Barro, R. J., 1990. Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous 
Growth. Journal of Political Economy, 98 (5), pp. 103-117. doi: 10.1086/261726
15. Barro, R. J., 2003. Determinants of Economic Growth in a Panel of Countries. 














































37 (4) 335-360 (2013)
35916. Barro, R., 1974. Are Government Bonds Net Wealth. Journal of Political Eco-
nomy, 82(6), pp. 1095-1117. doi: 10.1086/260266
17. Blanchard, O. J., 1990. A Comment in O. Blanchard and S. Fisher, eds. NBER 
Macroeconomic Annual 1990. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 111-115.
18. Bleaney, M., Gemmell, N. and Kneller, R., 2001. Testing the Endogenous 
Growth Model; Public Expenditure, Taxation and Growth Over the Long Run. 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 34(1), pp. 36-57. doi: 10.1111/0008-4085. 
00061
19. Bloom, D. E., Canning, D. and Sevilla, J., 2001. The Effect of Health on Eco-
nomic Growth: Theory and Evidence. NBER Working Paper 8587 [online].
Available at: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w8587.pdf?new_window=1>.
20. Bond, S., 2002. Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods 
and Practice. Portuguese Economic Journal, 1(2), pp. 141-162. doi: 10.1920/
wp.cem.2002.0902
21. Canning, D. and Pedroni, P., 2004. The Effect of Infrastructure on Long Run 
Economic Growth. Department of Economic Working Paper, 2004-04 [onli-
ne]. Available at: <http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/pedronniinfra-
structure.pdf>. 
22. Dalić, M., 2013. Cyclical Properties of Fiscal Policy in NMS. Journal of Post-
Communist Economies, 25(3), pp. 289-308. doi: 10.1080/14631377.2013. 
813144
23. de Avila, D. R. and Strauch, R., 2003. Public Finance and Long Term Growth 
in Europe – Evidence From Panel Data Analysis. ECB Working Paper 246. 
24. Devarajan, S., Swaroop, V. and Zou, H., 1996. The Composition of Public 
Expenditure and Economic Growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 37(2-3), 
pp. 313-344. doi: 10.1016/0304-3932(96)01249-4
25. Easterly, W. and Rebelo, S., 1993. Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An 
Empirical Investigation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3), pp. 417-458. 
doi: 10.1016/0304-3932(93)90025-B
26. Fatas, A. and Mihov, I., 2003. The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discre-
tion. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), pp. 1419-1448. doi: 
10.1162/003355303322552838
27. Fatas, A. and Mihov, I., 2009. Macroeconomic Policy: Does it Matter for 
Growth the Role of Volatility. Commission on Growth and Development, Wor-
king paper, No. 48 [online]. Available at: <http://www.gcbpp.org/files/Acade-
mic_Papers/fatas/AP_MacroeconomicPolicy_WorldBank_112009.pdf>. 
28. Gemmell, N., 2001. Fiscal Policy in a Growth Framework. WIDER Discussion 















































37 (4) 335-360 (2013)
360 29. Gemmell, N., Kneller, R. and Sanz, I., 2011. Fiscal Policy Impact on Growth 
in the OECD: Are They Long-Run? The Economic Journal, 121(55), pp. F33-
F58. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02414.x
30. Gupta, S. [et al.], 2002. Expenditure Composition, Fiscal Adjustments and 
Growth in Low Income Countries. Working paper 77 [online]. Available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0277.pdf>.
31. Hnatkovska, V. and Loayza, N., 2004. Volatility and Growth. World Bank Po-
licy Research Paper, 3184. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
32. Irmen, A. and Kuehnel, J., 2009. Productive Government Expenditures and 
Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(4), pp. 692-733. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-6419.2009.00576.x
33. King, R. G. and Rebelo, S., 1990. Public Policy and Economic Growth: Deve-
loping Neoclassical Implications. Journal of Political Economy, 98(3), pp. 
126-150. doi: 10.1086/261727
34. Kneller, R., Bleaney, M. and Gemmell, N., 1999. Fiscal Policy and Growth: 
Evidence from OECD Countries. Journal of Public Economics, 74(2), pp. 
171-190. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00022-5
35. La Porta, R. [et al.], 1996. Law and Finance. NBER Working Paper 5661 
[online]. Available at: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w5661.pdf?new_window 
=1>. 
36. Levine, R. and Renelt, D., 1998. A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross Country 
Growth Regressions. American Economic Journal, 82(4), pp. 942-963. 
37. Lucas, R., 1988. On the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 22(1), pp. 3-42. doi: 10.1016/0304-3932(88)90168-7
38. Romer, P. M., 1990. Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political 
Economy, 98(5), pp. S71-S102.
39. Zagler, M. and Dürnecker, G., 2003. Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth. 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 17(3), pp. 397-418. doi: 10.1111/1467-6419. 
00199
